In this paper
Even if time travelers
go to the past, there are things that they seem unable to do:
( Vihvelin agrees with Lewis in taking the possibility of changing the past as a matter of making a counterfactual supposition. However, she did not insist that autofanticide is just a special case which could be dealt with in the same way as other cases of changing the past. According to her, autofanticide is impossible because the following counterfactual proposition is false: "If a time traveler had tried to kill her younger self (many times), she might have succeeded". The reason is that its truth implies the denial of the natural law that a person's adulthood is caused by her childhood.(2) So it does not satisfy the requirement of counterfactual supposition to keep all else as close to fixed as you consistently can. By contrast, she did not believe that the proposition "If a time traveler had tried to kill one of her strangers (many times), she might have succeeded." is evidently false. For its truth does not necessarily contradict natural laws.
Here I would not try to decide which is right. Rather I would point out that both of them somewhat beg the question in taking the paradoxes as a matter of counterfactual supposition. To argue about counterfactual possibility of changing the past presupposes at least its metaphysical possibility. They seem to agree in thinking that if anything is logically possible, all the rest to consider is its causal or nomological possibility. In fact Vihvelin says: "The impossibility I am arguing for is neither anayltic nor logical; it's nomological."(3) They just disagree in deciding how far we have to fix causal factors or natural laws to make a counter factual supposition. Premise-A For any subject x and any two events e and f, if x experiences f after x experiences e, then f is not real at the moment when x experiences e. On the other hand, e is real at the moment when x experiences f. This formulation finds the source of the ontological asymmetry between the past and the future in the ontological asymmetry that lies in the history of a subject. Excepting the boundary moments of its birth and death, the history of a subject always consists of two parts: the real and determinate part from its birth to the It is to be noted that the precise meanings of the words 'real' and 'moment' used in Premise-A make no difference to the proof. The word 'real' is just required to have a certain univocal sense that keeps Premise-A acceptable. As for the word ' moment', since only the two successive events along Mary's world-line are con cerned, the relativity of simultaneity with each event does not matter.
However, Premise-A has limitations. It is just concerned with a single subject's experiences. So it cannot block, for instance, a time traveler's murder of his grandfather. Moreover, since it describes a subject of experiences, it cannot exclude the possibility of changing the past by something that cannot have experi ences, say, a stone, a table etc. So I generalize Premise-A to Premise-A' For any substance-chain x and any two events e and f, if f occurs to x after e occurs to x along its world-line, then f is not real at the moment when e occurs to x. On the other hand, e is real at the moment when f occurs to (2) Vihvelin (1996), p. 329.
(3) Vihvelin (1996) , p. 323.
